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Abstract
Cybersecurity governance is a critical issue for
organizations engaged in a constant struggle to protect
their data, brand, customers, and other assets from
malignant actors. The nature of what constitutes
successful cybersecurity practices and governance,
however, is not yet clear, in part because an
appropriate measure for cybersecurity success is not
likely to be singular or simple. In this qualitative study,
we explore perspectives of cybersecurity success
through interviews representing various technical and
non-technical roles across a variety of organizations,
then provide a preliminary framework for
understanding dimensions of cybersecurity success
(financial, information integrity, operational, and
reputational) as well as their associated knowledge
domains and alignments.

1. Introduction
Cybersecurity incident response has become a
nearly ubiquitous concern as attacks and breaches have
struck organizations across business, not-for-profit, and
governmental sectors. Indeed, the cost of cybercrime is
estimated to reach $2 trillion dollars by 2019; and
despite the increasing its severity, only 38% of
companies reported in a survey that they were prepared
to respond effectively to breaches and attacks
(https://securityintelligence.com/20-eye-openingcybercrime-statistics/). Organizations seeking to
address such cybersecurity threats must develop
governance policies which provide a goal framework
for both technological and human systems, including
managing the human performance and knowledge
resources of the firm [1]. A significant challenge to such
a framework is a lack of understanding of what
constitutes success in the cybersecurity domain,
especially beyond the information system itself. This
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understanding is needed to structure the knowledge
required to inform cybersecurity governance policies
that will support these broad forms of success. Once
these areas are better understood, they can enact a
comprehensive cybersecurity governance program,
which we define as “the sum total of an organization’s
efforts to protect its digital assets from unauthorized
access and control, and by extension, protect further
assets (e.g., people, intellectual property, finances)
which could be compromised by unauthorized access.”
In contrast to the popular adage, both cybersecurity
success and failure “have many fathers”. In other
words, a full understanding of what constitutes
cybersecurity success for organizations is not likely to
be singular or simple, reflecting the multiple
components involved in governance systems (e.g.,
technology, decision structure, human behavior) as well
as the variety of precipitating events and damages
associated with data breaches (defined as
“unauthorized access to sensitive, protected, or
confidential data resulting in the compromise or
potential compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the affected data” [2]. To this point, less
than half of the reported data security breaches (48%)
result from actual attacks by malicious agents; most
such breaches are caused more by human errors and
system failures [3]. With some exceptions, attempts to
address cybersecurity breaches have generally relied
upon technological solutions designed to scan incoming
data for potential issues. However, organizational
psychologists have recently begun to focus on the
human psychosocial elements of cybersecurity, and
particularly on the individual, team, and organizational
factors that facilitate successful responses to cyber
breaches. Because cybersecurity affects nearly every
person and every role in an organization’s structure,
each with a perspective grounded in distinct
knowledge, such a focus means identifying the
collective processes and emergent states that contribute
to more effective information sharing and application to
what are often novel forms of attacks [1, 4, 5].
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Successful cybersecurity practice therefore
requires alignment of knowledge among various
individuals, roles and systems, such that a knowledge
schema is formed at the organization level. To
understand this cybersecurity-focused knowledge
schema, we lean on team cognition research [6-8]
which provides frameworks describing knowledge
structure and content, such as degree of sharedness and
related dimensions [9].
This study explores what constitutes cybersecurity
success in organizations, in the perspective of
organizational actors, through a qualitative inquiry
using grounded theory method, including review of
related literature, interviews with key informants, and
thematic coding. We build upon the rich and established
research literature on information systems (IS) success
[10, 11], where proposed frameworks and empiricallytested constructs have focused on the data system itself.
Cybersecurity, however, is a more complex endeavor
going beyond technologies to also include people
across varying roles within an organizational structure,
and related processes that influence governance
operation. Consequently, we propose that the
appropriate definition and measure for cybersecurity
success is not singular, but is tightly interrelated with
multiple organizational structures, goals, processes and
actors. Thus, the primary research questions for this
study are:
1. How do organizations conceptualize and measure
their cybersecurity governance effectiveness?
2. How do such perspectives on cybersecurity success
differ across organization level and roles?
Once success is defined, effective cybersecurity
governance is enacted through the content and structure
of knowledge, including risk perspectives, held by the
variety of internal and external stakeholders across
roles and levels. These include board members exposed
to risk and liability, executives monitoring financial
returns, technical staff protecting hardware and
software resources, middle managers ensuring
continuity of their functional operations, and customers
concerned with identity theft. Therefore, as a secondary
focus, in this study we also investigate the content
domains and alignment structure of knowledge
associated with cybersecurity success.
3. What knowledge domains and alignments are
relevant to cybersecurity success?
We investigate and further develop these questions
through interviews with practitioners who fulfill varied
roles across multiple levels of a diverse set of
organizations in several industry sectors, informing our
understanding of effective cybersecurity practices,
measures, and governance. We then offer the findings

from this qualitative approach as a preliminary
framework for understanding cybersecurity success.

2. Extant Theory
To better understand what constitutes cybersecurity
success, we review the extant literature in this area.

2.1 Cybersecurity Success
The research literature suggests that IS project
performance consists of two distinct dimensions:
process performance and product performance [12-14].
Process performance has to do with the execution of the
project and is typically measured by on-time/ on-budget
project completion, user participation, and team
member satisfaction and morale [13, 15, 16]. Product
performance has to do with the actual information
system developed, including system quality,
functionality, impact, and user satisfaction with the
system. Based on these studies and DeLone and
McLean’s [11] updated IS Success Model, our
conceptualization and interview questions includes
several measures of IS project success: on-time
completion, within-budget completion, system
costs/effort, meeting system requirements, system
quality, user satisfaction, project team satisfaction,
system use, and net system benefits.
In their seminal paper [10] and follow up 10-year
review [11], DeLone and McLean [11] suggested
measures of system success, including system quality,
information quality, service quality, system use, user
satisfaction, individual impact and organizational
impact [10, 11]. This IS Success Model reports on the
numerous measures that have been studied under each
of these success dimensions. Organizational impact
measures include such measures as improved
organizational productivity, operating cost reductions,
sales growth and increased profits. These measures can
serve as a guide to identify potential outcomes of
cybersecurity success.
The present study builds upon this body of research
in IS success in several ways. First, cybersecurity is not
a technological system per se, but an ongoing activity
meant to protect not just systems and information, but
also financial concerns, privacy, reputation, operations,
processes and organizational outcomes. As such, it is a
broader and more complex construct to define. Second,
consistent with the standards set forth by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [17] we
view cybersecurity success as a two-phase endeavor:
(1) Pre-Incident – aimed at managing risk and
preventing breaches. This phase encompasses three
NIST functions: Identify, Protect and Detect; and (2)
Post-Incident – aimed at the expedient and effective
restoration of normal operations. This phase
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encompasses the other two NIST functions: Respond
and Recover. Therefore, cybersecurity success must
account for both, the extent to which breaches are
prevented and the timely recovery of normal
organizational systems and functions.

2.2 Shared Knowledge in Cybersecurity
While much has been written about cybersecurity
practices, risk and governance, very little research has
explored how the domain knowledge and its structural
alignment across organizational members may
influence risk exposure and potential business losses.
Cybersecurity-related knowledge may be held
differentially across organizational roles and levels; for
instance, members of the information security team
may share the basics of security protocols with productline managers, but both roles would also have
differentiated, unshared knowledge. Without an
appropriate sharing of knowledge, decisions would be
made in isolation, such as when cybersecurity
protection resources are budgeted only to safeguard
technical assets without regard for other perspectives.
However, technical breaches, such as those suffered in
recent years at the City of Baltimore, Starwood, Target
and Sony, demonstrate that companies must account for
risk of legal liability and loss of business value that
were previously unimaginable. We argue that
understanding the manner in which knowledge about
cybersecurity is shared across organizational levels and
entities is necessary to mitigate its associated risks and
to deal more effectively with breaches when they occur.
Thus, our research is designed to capture viewpoints
which may reveal multiple perspectives on what
constitutes cybersecurity success.
Cybersecurity incident response maturity models
have generally focused on both the technical and
individual capacities of in the incident response
systems. For example, the National Cyber Security
Centre in the Netherlands identified 5 areas of cyber
security incident response maturity: foundation, tools,
processes, organizational and human [18]. The
foundation element refers to the creation and structural
establishment of the incident response system. Tools
and processes refer respectively to the automation and
the technological infrastructure supporting incident
response and the establishment of formal core services
of the incident response system. The organizational
element refers to formal governance structures guiding
incident response. Finally, the human element refers to
the incident responder’s knowledge, skills and abilities.
Tetrick and colleagues [1] argued that this and
similar incident response models fail to capture the key
elements related to social functioning in incident
response collectives. Along this line, Zaccaro and
colleagues [5] noted that cybersecurity incident
response typically entails collective knowledge work in

which multiple analysts think and work together to
make sense of incoming incidents and develop
remediation solutions. Accordingly, Tetrick et al [1]
specified social maturity as another key element in
incident response models. They defined such maturity
as the degree to which incident response teams and
multiteam systems possess “the capacity to collaborate
well together in accomplishing [their] mission [and] to
develop an effective synergy among…members” (p.
48).
The effective sharing of information among
cybersecurity stakeholders represents a critical element
of incident response social maturity [5]. Information
sharing about cyber incidents occurs not only within
members of an incident response team, but also with
other teams within a multi-team incident response
system [see 4 for a description of such systems], as well
as with teams in other partnering organizations. The
speed, efficiency, and effectiveness of cyber incident
remediation depends heavily on the quality of such
information sharing and subsequent response
coordination. In turn, information sharing quality is
largely a function of the shared knowledge structures
and networks established to guide and regulate such
activities during incident response. As studies have
shown [19], the extent and manner in which team
members share knowledge has a strong impact on
project success.

3. Methods
3.1 Qualitative Inquiry and Grounded Theory
Method
Given the incomplete understanding and lack of a
widely accepted model of cybersecurity success, we
adopted grounded theory method, widely used in IS
research [20, 21], to qualitatively explore the
parameters of the success construct within its natural
contexts, interviewing key informants and comparing
their responses to discern themes and distinctions.
Consistent with this method, we developed our basic
interview questions from existing literature [22, 23].
We immersed ourselves in the extant knowledge of
cybersecurity success, we read numerous secondary
sources including scholarly works (e.g., ethnographies),
business press, trade publications, and traditional media
accounts. We then developed an initial coding scheme
through open coding of the first few interview
transcriptions aimed at uncovering general recurring
themes of interest [24]. We then used the resulting
themes once more, case by case, to contrast similarities
and differences across roles and organizations [25],
with consensus from three of the researchers involved
in this study. We then analyzed the relationship among
these themes.
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This approach enabled us “to uncover and
understand what lies behind any phenomenon about
which little is yet known” and “gain novel and fresh
slants” that build on existing theory [23, p.19]. We used
a parallel processing approach to apply a key tenet of
Grounded Theory – the iteration among new data, early
data and existing research [26]. We then iterated
informal and formal qualitative analyses with multiple
raters, employing hand coding and software-supported
analysis (i.e., NVivo©). Finally, we discussed the
resulting themes and factors within our research team.

3.2 Sample
We interviewed a total of 17 experienced
practitioners, drawn through a modified convenience
sample technique which utilized cold calls and existing
connections of the authors to contact a diverse array of
organizations. The authors also developed connections
through speaking at conferences and panels on
cybersecurity-related topics. To gain perspectives of the
variety of organizational roles who are jointly
responsible for the cybersecurity of the organization,
we targeted both technical and nontechnical
interviewees across a variety of roles and organizational
levels, including executives, members of boards of
directors, managers, and line staff in organizations
spanning several economic sectors, including
insurance, consulting, healthcare, energy, and higher
education. Our study sample is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Study Sample

Board

2

Legal

1

Audit

1
1

Cybersecurity Specialist

1
6

Total
3
1
1

1

1

1

1

2

1

Analyst
Total

Consulting &
Services

1

CIO
CISO

Institution

Government

Participant
Role

Corporate

Organization Type

1

4

5

8

1

1

6

17

All interviews were recorded and transcribed,
resulting in over 120,000 words and 240 pages of
material. The study reported in this paper is based on a
preliminary analysis of these interviews by two of the
three authors, who also conducted the interviews, and
a separate in-depth analysis of the first 9 interviews by
the remaining author and two research assistants.

3.3 Interview Protocol
The semi-structured interview protocol consisted
of open-ended questions focusing on a set of related
themes. The most relevant questions were the following
3 categories:
(1) conceptualization of cybersecurity success (e.g.,
What ends does your organization seek from your
cybersecurity program?)
(2) classification of cybersecurity breach severity (e.g.,
Please give examples of what you consider to be a (i)
critical; (ii) serious; (iii) minor cyber event. What
factors lead you to classify these events?); and
(3) extent of organizational knowledge on pre-incident
(identify, protect and detect) and post-incident
(response and recover) phases of the NIST framework.
During the interviews we focused participants on
contrasting what they knew, what others knew, and
what colleagues should know about cybersecurity
governance. Given the semi-structured nature of the
interviews, interviewers were free to explore interesting
themes in more detail and were not required to ask
every question in the protocol.

3.4 Analysis
Following Miles and Huberman [27] and Strauss
and Corbin [23], our literature review and research
questions played a sensitizing role, suggesting the a
priori constructs. Following the initial set of interviews,
the two authors who conducted the interviews recorded
their impressions, including development of an initial
framework of cybersecurity success. In keeping with
principles of qualitative inquiry, our analysis granted
preliminary validity to all dimensions of cybersecurity
success revealed in the interview process, as long as
they increased the parameters of the construct. The
frequency with which dimensions were mentioned was
noted, although this did not necessarily further validate
the dimension’s utility. We then compared coding with
the goal of attaining what Kvale terms “dialogical
intersubjectivity,” [28, p.154] a form of reliability via
discussion regarding complex phenomena. Two
authors, who conducted the interviews, pulled
preliminary themes from the interviews. The third
author and two research assistants, none of whom
participated in the interviews, conducted separate
coding and thematic analysis of the data by using
NVivo© software. As a final step, the first two authors
reviewed and refined the coded themes, identifying
relations among them.

4. Findings
4.1 Cybersecurity Success
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Our findings provided strong evidence that there
are multiple dimensions of cybersecurity success which
reflect the desire to achieve stable fulfillment of
organizational goals, measured as size, depth, scope, or
duration in one or more of these aspects of the system:
financial, reputational, operational, and information
integrity. This is consistent with prior arguments from
DeLone & McLean [10, 11] and Jennex et al. [29].
These dimensions of cybersecurity success often
seemed to fit with the strategic goals of their particular
industry, and also the role of the person interviewed,
with some overlap across these perspectives. This can
be seen in the frequency that the dimensions were
mentioned in the interviews: (1) financial impact (15
interviews, 29 references); (2) system integrity/
information protection (14 interviews, 33 references);
(3) operational continuity or disruption (11 interviews,
21 references); (4) organizational reputation (12
interviews, 31 references); and (5) temporal or
quantitative extent of a cybersecurity intrusion (7
interviews, 9 references). Next, we discuss these key
dimensions, listed in Table 2, in more detail, and also
refer to additional important success indicators
mentioned by our interviewees, such as regulatory
compliance, health outcomes, intellectual property, and
others.
Table 2. Cybersecurity Success Dimensions
Key Dimensions
(Impact Areas)
Financial Impact
System Integrity &
Information Protection
Operational Continuity
or Disruption
Organizational
Reputation

Impact Size, Scope, Temporality
Examples
Magnitude of revenue protection &
cost avoidance; impact on earnings
Number and importance of personal
records exposed to theft
Extent and duration of disruption;
Healthcare mortality
Extent and duration of reputational
damage

4.1.1 Financial
For private enterprises and many not-for-profit
organizations, cybersecurity effectiveness was
evaluated in terms of revenue protection and/or cost
avoidance at some point in the sequence of
organizational factors that comprise their value chains
[30]. Even in not-for-profit organizations, financial
considerations were important in providing and
sustaining resources, in ultimate pursuit of stakeholder
fulfillment [31]. For publicly traded companies this
financial impact extended to the influence of
cybersecurity incidents on stock price and shareholder
value. Thus, when considering a given point in time,
most success measures may have an impact, at least
indirectly, on the financial bottom line, as this
participant’s comment illustrates: “You know if I'm a
pharma company then ... if somebody steals the secret
formula ... that is a major loss. Or if it's a movie studio

somebody … gets an early copy of the release … so in
most cases it's a downstream financial loss.”
In this case, information integrity is compromised
(i.e. intellectual property is stolen), which will result in
lost revenue, ultimately limiting the ability of the
organization to fulfill its mission.
Also, organizations that have experienced personal
information breaches may pay out a per-person fee for
credit monitoring. The impact of breaches, such as
denial of service attacks or others with operational
disruptions translate into lost revenues. Reputational
damage (discussed below) can also be assessed by its
impact on customer loyalty and ultimately by lost sales.
Additionally, cybersecurity incidents often have
associated costs of remediation (e.g., ransom payment)
and recovery. Therefore, the overall measure of success
is the avoidance of revenue loss plus response and
recovery expenses.
It might be tempting to conclude that every factor
and dimension related to cybersecurity success are
subservient to, or at least leading to, the organization’s
financial outcomes. However, this view may fail to
consider the important temporal, human and strategic
dimensions. Financial outcomes often lag behind
cybersecurity decisions and actions made at a given
point in time. For instance, cybersecurity investments
made at a given time might have differential financial
outcomes later. An effective solution to a cybersecurity
issue may require an investment that sacrifices shorterterm financials for longer-term viability.
The personal stake of cybersecurity governance
decision-makers in terms of protecting their managerial
or board positions, may not align directly with optimal
financial
outcomes.
Additionally,
satisfying
stakeholders or achieving an organization’s mission
may supersede optimal financial decisions, especially
for not-for-profits or government agencies. Our
interviewees supported the need to look beyond
financial considerations when defining cybersecurity
success, as explained below.
4.1.2 System Integrity & Information Protection
The earliest and most publicized cybersecurity
incidents have involved the theft of personal
information, especially credit card data (identity theft).
Examples include Marriott International, Target,
Anthem, Equifax, Facebook, the City of Baltimore’s
ransomware attack, and the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management (OPM). These cybersecurity events
gained prominence for the sheer volume of records
(millions) that were compromised. Large companies
and/or their cyber insurance companies have incurred
costs per compromised record, amounting to millions of
dollars in remediation costs. As a result, the corporate
risk management spotlight has often been focused on
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the protection of personal information of customers and
employees.
Personal information protection has been further
heightened by the recent rollout of the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
with its massive fine potential for non-compliance.
Naturally, publicized data breaches can impact
customer trust and future purchases; resulting in further
revenue loss. For example, one participant noted that
“cybersecurity integrity is certainly paramount … what
made that major was because of the information access
to everything else. … privacy involves the third or
fourth on our list of importance.”
4.1.3 Operational Continuity or Disruption
One important goal of a cybersecurity governance
program is to maintain continuity of business
operations. Denial of service attacks, ransomware
incidents and viruses like WannaCry are examples of
cyberattacks meant to disrupt or shut down
organizational operations. These are among the more
devastating cybersecurity incidents resulting in
significant revenue loss and in the case of healthcare
systems, the potential loss of life, as a participant
articulated: “I would say a critical event would be an
intrusion into an operating plan or an operating system
and losing control of that for some period of
time…completely disrupting a bank or insurance
company, and actually disrupting their operations, is a
much more serious event.”
Another participant also noted how dramatic losing
operational control can be: “A critical event would be
an intrusion into an operating plan or an operating
system and losing control of that for some period of
time. … to take Shell or Exxon or one of those guys, the
deepwater platforms, one of them produces 200,000
barrels a day of oil. If you lost control of that because
somebody hacked into your system, your skater system
and your control system, and you've lost control of that.
That would be a major event.”
Thus, one of the major dimensions of an effective
cybersecurity program is avoiding or limiting any
disruption to operations, as exemplified by this
comment from an informant: “If you have some sort of
type of system outage that we have seen that have
impacted some airlines where they've had significant
outages where there were several clients that had issues
arising from the Mirai botnet… that impacted their
organization where they did quite a bit of business
online … where clients weren’t able to access the sites
and they ended up incurring quite a bit of expense with
it as well as a loss of income.”
4.1.4 Organizational Reputation
Many senior executives and board members worry
most about the risk of reputational damage resulting

from a publicly reported cybersecurity attack that might
result in the theft of personal information or reveal
damaging internal communications, as this participant
comment illustrates: “the best outcome is never have
anything embarrassing happen.” This seems to be a
most salient theme, particularly at higher levels of the
organization, as this comment illustrates: “One is
where information is pulled out and then that breach is
made public so that somebody not only pulls
information out which is damaging enough or money
out, but they actually demonstrate in public that they've
done it. And then there's an impact on your brand
potentially.”
Another participant also noted that “as a security
person I didn’t care about denial of service, I would
categorize it as minor. But for an insurance carrier,
that would be major because, for example, imagine the
business interruption, the business impact and effect on
your insurance policy if delta.com got knocked offline”.
Reputational or brand damage can result in loss of
customer trust, purchases and loyalty. Furthermore,
these impacts can be longer lasting than a disruption in
operations that has a discrete time limitation, as this
comment about the Sony breaches illustrates: “the Sony
attack from a couple of years ago; part of the novelty
there is that the threat … specifically wanted to target
e-mail communications of the top leadership to bear.
They say they stole a lot of other information too. But
part of what they went after was e-mails where they
found company executives talking negatively about
Hollywood stars.” On the flip side, positive
cybersecurity performance may enhance a company’s
image as a trusted partner dedicated to protecting
customer information and privacy.
4.1.5 Other Important Success Measures
Our participants mentioned additional measures and
indicators of success. Regulatory compliance was
another frequently mentioned success issue. As one
board member put it: “there's a whole bunch of
regulatory … things that can create some huge
problems.” Organizations are concerned about large
government fines related to failure to protect personal
information or failure to report breaches that might
impact an organization’s operational and/or financial
performance materially. The large fines being meted
out by the European Union under the new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) are emerging as a
significant issue. Thus, avoiding such fines is a
meaningful success measure. Potential SEC fines for
misleading filings represent both unwanted costs and
reputational damage. One senior executive stated that
“we have to be very careful … because of SEC filings.
There are certain things, depending on how much they
cost and the impact as defined by the SEC and it affects
your ratings so companies have to be sure that, if they
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classify an attack … adjusting their 10K to reflect the
cost of those systems (breaches).”
Similarly, organizations want to avoid the overhead
costs and productivity loss associated with
governmental compliance audits. Regulatory issues
can extend the impact of a cybersecurity breach by
adding costs and/or reputational damage to other
foundational impacts. Good cybersecurity governance
reduces financial and reputational risks by avoiding
regulatory action.
Interestingly, some cybersecurity success measures
are industry specific. For example, quality of care and
mortality metrics are critical in the healthcare industry.
Environmental impacts are key to success in the oil and
gas industry. One representative of the oil and gas
industry stated: “But if something happened and it
caused an oil spill, that would be huge.”
Responses from board members and executives are
more representative of enterprise success measures. For
example, an important measure for senior managers is
intellectual property protection, a significant
competitive advantage issue. As one respondent put it:
“(the theft of) intellectual property … is the most
dangerous to our organizations and organizations have
not figured out what to do with that.”
Finally, it is also important to acknowledge that
individuals at all levels of the organization identified
success measures that may be in conflict with enterprise
cybersecurity success measures. Therefore, those
individuals may take cybersecurity actions that are not
in the best interest of the organization as a whole. Job
preservation is a prime example. IT managers and/or
executives may choose not to disclose serious breaches
for fear of termination. As documented in the business
press, multiple Chief Information Security Officers,
Chief Information Officers and Chief Executive
Officers have lost their jobs due to serious cybersecurity
intrusions. Board of Directors’ satisfaction with an
organizational cybersecurity governance program is an
important factor in managerial job security. For
example, one board member commented that
management will disclose cybersecurity breaches to the
board only when approved by legal counsel. Most
companies will have thresholds or committees to decide
when to disclose particular information to the board.

4.2 Incident Severity
In order to understand how knowledge alignment
can affect cybersecurity success, we first had to
understand how participants classified the severity of
cybersecurity incidents as either severe, serious, or
minor.
Critical Events: were those associated with irreparable
financial or reputational damage. One participant
referred to these as “business-ending” events.

However, most participants were less dramatic, but
indeed referred to events of broader scope that could
seriously compromise things like critical infrastructure,
personal identities, intellectual property and service
delivery. For example, one participant discussed the
adverse effects that a breach of hospital patient records
could have. Another participant commented on the
irreparable damage that massive breaches of identity in
organizations can, as this participant comment
illustrates: “when many federal employees now have
their fingerprints potentially compromised and that's
something that cannot be regenerated because it is
acute and specific. So those people have the possibility
of having some level of compromise or inability to have
non-repudiation of their identity for the rest of their
lives”.
Serious Events: are somewhat similar in nature to
critical events, but narrower in scope and with more
limited reputational and financial impact. There was
general agreement that these affect individual systems,
small groups of individuals or single departments, noncritical infrastructure and non-critical services, among
other entities.
Table 3. Cybersecurity Incident Severity
Examples
Incident Severity: Examples from
Interviews
Minor

Financial
Impact

Systems
Integrity &
Information
Protection

Ransomware
attack on a
limited number
of computers
with a small
financial loss
relative to
company size.

An individual’s
social network
account hack.

Operational DDoS attacks
Continuity or (for an IS
specialist)
Disruption

Serious
Paycheck
redirection to a
malicious actor
of a large
group of
employees
(hard or nonrepayable
money loss).
Starwood,
Sony, Home
Depot, Target
hacks that
took significant
financial
resources to
recover.
Ukrainian
power grid in
summer of
2015 with no
human lives
lost.

Customers’
payment card
Change a
information,
Organizational homepage of a social security
numbers, ID
Reputation company’s
website.
breach that a
company must
acknowledge.

Critical
Theft of a drug
formula from a
pharmaceutical
company that
reduces ability
to recoup
development
investments.
A lobbyist’s
phone hack
when a foreign
government
gets access to
sensitive US
government
information.
Intrusion of an
operating
system of an oil
and gas
company,
losing control
for a time.

Equifax breach
with nonrecoverable
reputation loss.

Minor Events: there is some consensus among
participants that minor events are those that need to be
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addressed, but that they are mostly nuisance issues with
limited financial or reputational impact, and very
narrow in scope. Some examples of this include identity
theft of single individuals, viruses and malware
affecting one or few users, and minor phishing
breaches.
Interviewees mentioned further examples of
cybersecurity events of varying severity, from their
own organizations and references to incidents known
from the popular press or their own contacts. We
include some of these examples in Table 3.

4.3 Knowledge Alignment
The primary purpose of the present study, and the
focus of the first two research questions, was to develop
the construct of cybersecurity success. Once this is
defined, our third research question can help explore the
domains and alignment of knowledge among the
multiple cybersecurity actors and roles, necessary to
achieve cybersecurity success in organizations. From
our interviews, we are able to sketch out some
preliminary findings of interest. One important thing to
note is that most participants responded to our questions
from one of three perspectives: what they themselves
knew; what others in different roles knew; and what
people should really know. Another interesting finding
to note is that the NIST Framework is not necessarily
widely adopted, but when participants discussed
cybersecurity knowledge areas, a great deal of the
policies and procedures they mentioned fitted within
the NIST Framework functional categories, even if not
classified that way verbatim by them.
Perhaps the most interesting thing to note is the
differences in perceptions about knowledge and
information across roles. For example, participants in
cybersecurity technical roles were typically confident
that the critical cybersecurity practices were in place
and that their organizations were well protected against
breaches. They tended to rate their knowledge of preincident aspects (i.e., identify, detect, protect) as very
high and were also confident that policies and
procedures were in place for effective post-incident
response and recovery.
This perspective was not always shared by others
who were more focused on risk management than on
specific cybersecurity checklists and policy
compliance. Middle to upper management respondents
reported more concern about governance and the
appropriate level of information sharing with the board.
Indeed, some of our interviewees noted that
information sharing cannot be widespread in every
instance because it can create panic situations, and it
was necessary to be very careful about which incidents
to escalate to the upper management or to the governing
board. One study participant in a cybersecurity

management role commented: “I would say that the
number one thing is that the board is happy, and we are
not having to notify on data breaches over a long period
of time. That's a beautiful thing for sure. That's a
number one no data breach is awesome. That doesn't
mean that they're not happening right?” The same
participant noted that before even declaring an event as
a cybersecurity incident, a substantial evaluation and
discussion was required: “…so it's not necessarily a
cybersecurity incident, but it could be and we are going
to report out our next report will be in 30 minutes. Our
next report might be in an hour. Our next report may be
in four hours because it's inherently [sic] and we're not
going to have anything that is really appreciably
different than the time before. [The report would state:]
Please do not share this information beyond this group.
No need to escalate yet. This is confidential as we're
still in the investigation stages.”
In some cases, the differentiation of cybersecurity
knowledge extended beyond the boundaries of the focal
organization. Our interviewees reported that this
outsourced knowledge may come through a specialized
consultant, an estimate for insurance (often according
to its own set of cybersecurity standards), or an
interpretation of industry or government guidelines,
such as in the form of a scorecard. These cases include
variation in both content of knowledge, in that the
outsiders bring in new information or perspectives, and
the knowledge structure of in terms of who holds that
particular expertise.
Interestingly, high-level managers discussed the
importance of communication protocols related to
cybersecurity incidents, and that it is a matter of
deciding when to escalate an issue to the board, but a
board member commented that the flow of information
from upper management to the board is often controlled
and filtered by legal counsel, as this comment by a
board member illustrates: “management filters the
story to shift the narrative … just to clarify that a little
bit more which is why the general counsel ultimately
gets involved is the general counsel typically prepares
the agenda for the board. And if they don't want to
speak much then there's five minutes on cybersecurity.
If you’re going to say something you must rehearse it
with the general counsel prior go into the board …
cybersecurity is highly controversial. Therefore, the
role the general counsel serves as a gatekeeper to
decide whether or not they will let the board hear the
information or not.”
Overall, our preliminary results suggest that people
in more technical roles within cybersecurity are more
knowledgeable about pre-incident areas and they tend
to have confidence in their ability to protect the
organization, at least publicly. Management is more
concerned with risk mitigation and effective response
and recovery plans and may carefully select what
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knowledge and information is shared with the board.
The board is more concerned with understanding their
liability and exposure, and how incidents may impact
shareholders.
One more interesting issue emerging from the data
is about the type of knowledge that needs to be shared.
The team cognition literature differentiates the various
team knowledge constructs into durable – i.e.,
knowledge acquired over time, which remains relevant
over time (e.g., procedures, tools, policies) and fleeting
– i.e., situational knowledge that is relevant while a
situation is in progress (e.g., presence awareness, task
awareness, etc.), which becomes irrelevant when the
situation passes [32]. In this regard, there seems to be a
parallel with other domains like in sports and military
operations, in which teams need to train and learn over
long periods of time, acquiring durable knowledge to be
able to perform effectively and efficiently during games
or operations. Similarly, our data suggests that
cybersecurity actors need to share substantial amounts
of durable knowledge during pre-incident phases, but
then need to share fleeting knowledge during postincident phases, in a timely and efficient manner,
fostering effective situational awareness [33].

5. Conclusions
This study explores the construct of cybersecurity
success, grounded in a set of qualitative interviews with
professionals who fulfill varied roles across levels of
organizations in multiple industry sectors. Our findings
indicate that cybersecurity success is multifaceted,
including financial, information integrity, operational,
and reputational dimensions, each with varying
relevance to differing organizations and roles. This
multidimensional view of cybersecurity success is
important for both research and practical
considerations. Defining an array of cybersecurity
success dimensions allows organizations to clarify
connections of their governance policies and practices
with specific outcomes meaningful to their line of
business. Similarly, organizational researchers can use
such connections to model relationships, build theory,
and test hypotheses to deepen understanding of
effective cybersecurity governance.
Additionally, we find preliminary evidence that
knowledge domains related to particular dimensions of
cybersecurity outcomes are differentially distributed
across organizational roles and levels. Technical and
non-technical roles, as well as executive and functional
managers, hold dissimilar knowledge content.
However, this knowledge needs to be aligned in terms
within and across job roles, both in terms of durable and
situational awareness knowledge of where to turn in the
case of cybersecurity breaches or threats. Further
examination, such as through policy-capturing or

survey research, may help to reveal optimal
distributions of specific knowledge domains to achieve
varied forms of cybersecurity success without
expecting all organizational members to become
experts in every aspect of cybersecurity.
Finally, it is evident that organizations vary in their
ratings of severity thresholds for critical, serious, and
minor cybersecurity incidents. This variance seems
related to the line of business, such as healthcare
institutions rating illicit access to patient data as a more
critical breach than would a retail company whose
customer preferences were released, which might be a
serious but not necessarily critical breach for that
company. This, again, can help to build meaningful
predictive models for particular businesses or industry
sectors.
Overall, this research is an important step toward
understanding the many ways that organizations may
define cybersecurity success, as well as to enact
effectiveness through knowledge application within
their cyber governance systems. Our framework of the
success of cybersecurity governance systems, although
preliminary, provides rich grounds for further research
in this area. These research efforts can assess the
validity of our preliminary cybersecurity success
dimensions, refining connecting success outcomes to
particular knowledge domains, structural alignments,
and organizational practices.
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